CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

CD/962
1 February 1990

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF THE 1990 SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the message of His Excellency Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico, to the Conference on Disarmament on the occasion of the opening of the 1990 session.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the message to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Miguel Marín Bosch
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.90-60067/5161A

MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT OF H.E. CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

Today the Conference on Disarmament is once again taking up its important task, at a time of renewed hope in disarmament. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have begun talks and negotiations on a number of issues, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and the community of nations is witnessing the emergence of fresh and encouraging developments in the search for international peace and security.

The Conference on Disarmament now has before it an unmatched opportunity to translate this climate of détente into specific agreements on the priority issues: nuclear disarmament, and more particularly the cessation of all nuclear tests, and the elimination of chemical weapons.

Disarmament has been under discussion at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for over a half a century. We ought now to move forward along the path marked out by the United Nations to achieve a safer world with fewer weapons. The ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains as valid today as it was in 1962 when this Conference began its work.

As members of the Conference on Disarmament, all of us have a duty and an obligation to fulfil the hopes of the peoples of the world, to banish the spectre of war and its deadly instruments. The bilateral understandings should be followed by disarmament agreements negotiated on a multilateral basis. The most pressing issue is the total suspension of nuclear tests. A number of possibilities are open to us in order to achieve that objective.

The elimination of chemical weapons is also a matter of priority. The international community is entitled to demand the rapid conclusion of a convention in this field. We need to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament to serve as a framework for our efforts. Not one of us, moreover, is unaware of the close link between disarmament and economic development.

We have instructed our delegation to the Conference to maintain Mexico's constructive contribution towards achieving the objectives we have all set outselves and to strive to strengthen the role of the United Nations in this field of such vital importance to mankind.

I should now like to take this opportunity to say a few words to the Conference about a great Mexican who is well known to all of you.

The Government of Mexico will shortly be paying a national tribute to Mr. Alfonso García Robles. On behalf of the people and Government of Mexico, I should like here and now to express our gratitude to Ambassador Emeritus García Robles for his tireless devotion in defending the guiding principles of our foreign policy. Those principles correspond to those in the Charter of the United Nations, an organization he served for 10 years as an international official.

His involvement in this Conference began almost a quarter of a century ago, on 21 February 1967, when he presented the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been opened for signature in Mexico City a week before. It was quite natural that the presentation should have been the responsibility of the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as he had led Mexico's efforts to evolve a legal instrument embodying Latin America's aspiration to become a nuclear-free zone. He subsequently participated actively and without interruption in the annual sessions of the Conference of Disarmament: first of all as Under-Secretary, then as Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and in 1977 as Minister for Foreign Affairs. From 1977 onwards, he became Permanent Representative to the Conference itself.

In 1982 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden. Today we wish to assure him once again of our respect, recognition and gratitude.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/963
7 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 1990 session

and

Programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament

(Adopted at its 532nd plenary meeting on 6 February 1990)

The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;

II. Chemical weapons;

III. Other weapons of mass destruction;

IV. Conventional weapons;

V. Reduction of military budgets;

VI. Reduction of armed forces;

VII. Disarmament and development;

VIII. Disarmament and international security;

IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;

X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

GE.90-60118/5218A

Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1990 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

4. Chemical weapons.

5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Programme of work

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1990 session.

6 - 16 February	Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions.
19 February - 2 March	Nuclear test ban. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
5 - 9 March	Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
12 - 16 March	Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
19 - 30 March	Chemical weapons.
2 - 6 April	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

9 - 13 April	Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
16 - 24 April	Further consideration of outstanding matters.

The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning and will report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on that subject.

The Conference will further intensify its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 14 and 15 of its report (CD/956) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1990 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States and the need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference and will inform accordingly the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Meetings of the subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 19 to 30 March 1990.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/964
7 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(Adopted at the 532nd plenary meeting on 6 February 1990)

The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1990 session an Ad hoc Committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Ad hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1990 session.

GE.90-60124/5219A

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/965
7 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the re-establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons

(Adopted at the 532nd plenary meeting on 6 February 1990)

The Conference decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1990 session, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The Ad hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1990 session.

GE.90-60130/5220A

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/966
CD/CW/WP.275
14 February 1990

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Trial challenge inspection at a military facility

Issues related to verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention by the States parties to it are under active discussion in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

In 1988 and 1989 national trial inspections to test procedures for verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry were conducted in a number of the States which are involved in the negotiations, and reports on those inspections were submitted to the Conference on Disarmament.

The results of such inspections facilitate more detailed work on systematic monitoring of facilities to be declared under article VI of the draft convention and its annexes, and the securing of agreement thereon.

The Soviet Union also views the holding of national trial inspections as a form of practical preparation on the part of States for their role as parties to the future chemical weapons convention.

With a view to the finalization and acceptance of procedures for conducting challenge inspections under article IX of the draft convention, it was considered useful to conduct national trial inspections at facilities which may be subject to such forms of verification subsequently, when the convention has entered into force.

Information on a trial challenge inspection conducted in the USSR is furnished below.

When selecting a facility for the holding of the trial inspection, the Soviet side bore in mind that under the future convention a challenge inspection may be conducted at any site or facility in a State party, with the challenged State having no right of refusal.

It is felt that the most typical grounds for challenge may be doubt on the part of States parties to the convention based on the suspected covert storage or production of chemical weapons by another State party.

Against this background, the facility selected for the trial inspection was an ordnance depot, at which chemical weapons are not and have never been stored.

The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether or not chemical weapons were present at the military depot.

Description of the facility:

Area - about 3 sq. km.

Perimeter - about 7 km.

Number of buildings and structures - about 100.

Storage capacity - more than 1,000 railway wagons.

Nature of terrain - rugged, wooded.

The trial inspection was conducted between 15 and 20 May 1989. The size of the inspection team, including observers, was 20 persons. They included armaments experts, specialists in CW detection and experts from the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. The team owed its relatively large size to the fact that it dealt itself with all the organizational problems connected with the preparations for and the conduct of the inspection.

Programme of the trial inspection

As this was a national exercise, and since it was a first attempt at conducting a challenge inspection, the facility management was notified in advance of the objectives of the inspection team and the timing of its visit.

However, no actions were accomplished at the facility in direct reaction to the team's visit.

On the inspection team's arrival at the facility, the management held a meeting with the team members. The meeting lasted one hour.

During the meeting the leader of the inspection team informed the facility management of the purposes of the team's visit and its tasks.

The facility director informed the inspection team of the basic features of the facility, described its layout and indicated what in his view were the most sensitive areas which, he felt, could have no connection with storage of chemical weapons.

The leader of the inspection team requested the facility director to arrange for the team members to have unimpeded access to all points within the facility site, to inspect means of transport entering and leaving the facility and to take samples at places indicated by the inspectors.

The members of the inspection team were given 15 minutes' instruction in accident prevention at the facility. The members of the inspection team signed a register indicating that they had received such instruction.

By decision of the leader of the inspection team, it was divided into the following subgroups:

A subgroup to study documentation. Task: to verify the presence or absence of CW-related correspondence;

A subgroup to inspect the facility buildings and structures. Task: to visit storage areas and investigate the presence or absence of chemical weapons;

A subgroup to monitor means of transport entering and leaving the grounds of the facility. Task: to inspect means of transport and observe the facility perimeter;

A subgroup to work with the facility staff. Task: to interview facility staff on issues directly connected with the aims of the inspection.

A representative of the facility management attached to each subgroup accompanied the inspectors and assisted in the performance of their duties.

During the inspection the inspection team did not address direct instructions to the facility staff or request them to perform operations or actions they considered necessary for the conduct of the inspection. All such requests were addressed to the representatives of the facility management accompanying the inspection team.

During the inspection the inspection team endeavoured to refrain from gathering and keeping information unrelated to chemical weapons. Nevertheless, a large amount of such information concerning the dump came to the notice of the inspectors.

The inspection team visited and examined at close hand 10 per cent of the installations located within the depot. All the types of buildings and structures on the site were visited on a selective basis at the discretion of the inspection team.

The places visited by the inspectors were identified on the basis of indirect factors which, in the opinion of the inspection team, might indicate the presence of chemical weapons. These included the presence of air purification sytems in storage areas; the presence of protective gear and decontamination equipment in or immediately next to storage areas; the presence of specially protected sectors on the facility site, equipped with indication and warning systems; the absence of data on the operations of individual storage areas or other subdivisions of the facility within the overall system of documentation, or separate correspondence for individual subdivisions of the facility; the presence of storage areas from which items had been removed immediately prior to the arrival of the inspection team, according to information obtained from examination of the documentation and interviews with the facility staff.

The inspection team began its verification work with the least intrusive verification methods. However, as the facility management did not propose alternative measures which the inspection team found sufficiently persuasive and which would have made it unnecessary to visit the most sensitive areas of the facility, the team was obliged to acquaint itself with a specially circumscribed sector on the facility site. Moreover, the record-keeping methods used in the facility made it impossible to draw a clear line between information which the inspectors would have been justified in studying in view of the purposes of the inspection, and information which could have no connection whatsoever with chemical weapons.

On visits to the storage areas the inspectors visually examined specimens of the armaments and munitions kept there, compared the markings on the containers and on the specimens in them, verified their compliance and examined the external appearance of the stored munitions. Air samples were taken in the storage areas by the facility management at the request of the inspectors and in their presence.

Radio links were used for communications between the subgroups and the leader of the inspection team. For this purpose the facility management allocated one radio set for each subgroup and one for the leader of the inspection team.

During the inspection the inspection team interviewed the facility staff in the presence of the representative of the facility management who was accompanying them. In the course of the interviews the representative of the management rejected those questions which in his opinion went beyond the purposes of the inspection or the duties of the inspectors. In cases where the inspectors considered that a rejected question was indeed relevant to the conduct of the inspection, the situation was resolved between the leader of the inspection team and the facility director.

As a result of the trial inspection the inspection team established that there were no chemical weapons at the inspected facility. It should be pointed out, however, that such an unequivocal result was possible because the members of the inspection team who participated in the national inspection were conversant with the designations of types of Soviet chemical weapons, so that it was possible to dispense with the need to open the munitions in order to determine the type of charge used.

The inspection team considers that two factors should be borne in mind when conducting a challenge inspection at a military facility in order to clarify situations involving the suspected covert storage of chemical weapons.

First, a search should be made for specimens of chemical weapons on which information has been supplied in the declarations made by States parties within 30 days after the convention enters into force. In this way the task of the inspection team will be substantially simplified, since the main thrust of the inspection will be reduced to determining the presence or absence of specimens whose basic parameters are known.

Second, a search for undeclared specimens of chemical weapons may be conducted. In this case the task of the inspection team may be put differently: it will be to verify the presence or absence of undeclared forms or types of chemical weapons.

To perform the second task it is necessary to open specimens of munitions, devices and containers in order to verify the absence of a charge characteristic of a chemical weapon - or, to lessen the degree of intrusiveness in verification, to develop methods and techniques of verification not using contact methods whereby it can be determined unambiguously, without opening the casing, that a given specimen is not a chemical weapon.

The results of the inspection also demonstrate that the international inspectorate must undertake to safeguard confidential information which becomes known to the inspectors in the course of their duties in applying the convention and which is not connected with chemical weapons.

In order to reduce the level of disclosure of sensitive information which is not CW-related, the management of a facility being inspected must be able, during the inspection, to propose alternative measures as a substitute for access by the inspectors to particularly confidential information. However, the test of acceptability of such alternative measures must in every case be that they are satisfactory to the inspection team.

The results of the inspection demonstrate that where no breaches are identified during the verification process, the inspection report should contain a minimum of information and should not reveal the nature of the activities conducted in the facility.

In the view of the inspection team, inspections to clarify situations involving the suspected covert storage of chemical weapons are likely to be among the most complicated and labour-intensive types of challenge inspection.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/967
14 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGERIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Agreement on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, proposed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and addressed to the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by the Honourable Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria, on 2 November 1989.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of the text of this Agreement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) E.A. Azikiwe
Permanent Representative

AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Being also parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 (hereinafter called "the Treaty"), have hereby accepted the following provisions:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which does not belong to a military alliance and does not have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence with a nuclear-weapon State.

Article II

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which belongs to a military alliance, or have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence, with a nuclear-weapon State but has no nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. The non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty referred to in this Article undertakes not to partake in, or contribute to, any military attack on any nuclear-weapon State Party to this Agreement, or its allies, Parties to the Treaty, except in self-defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article III

1. This Agreement shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty applied hereto.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force in respect of each State on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession of the State concerned.

3. The duration of this Agreement shall be the same as that of the Treaty and the provision regarding denunciation contained in Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty shall be applicable to it.

Article IV

This Agreement, the English, Russian, French and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary

Governments. Duly certified copies of this Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the .....day of ....., one thousand nine hundred and .....

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/968
15 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Decision on the Re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

(Adopted at the 535th plenary meeting on 15 February 1990)

The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 44/115 A and B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1990 session, the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1990 session.

GE.90-60180/5333A

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/969
CD/CW/WP.277
19 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

HUNGARY

Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention

With the view of contributing to the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention the Hungarian Foreign Minister put forward an initiative at the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly declaring that Hungary was ready to comply with all the provisions of the convention under drafting and to act in full conformity with it at this stage already. This meant the reaffirmation of the chemical-weapons-free status of the country, the obligation to make regular declarations on the production, export and import of chemicals, the readiness to accept verification - including on-site inspection - on a reciprocal basis, regarding all declared facts and figures as well as our military industrial and trading activities relating to the scope of the convention, and finally the intention to set up an appropriate body to perform provisionally some of the duties of the national authority to be established under the convention. In accordance with the contents of the initiative Hungary wishes to present the following declaration on the production, consumption, as well as the export and import of chemicals relevant to the convention.

The declaration was prepared in conformity with the draft provisions of the convention. The data contained in the declaration are based on the co-operative and voluntary contribution of chemical plants and enterprises.

Quantities exceeding one ton and thirty tons for Schedule 2 and Schecule 3 chemicals respectively are contained in the declaration. The declared quantities appear within a range which is a possible alternative envisaged in the draft provisions. The limits mentioned above together with the general methodology adopted for the purposes of the present declaration are not intended to prejudice in any way the final agreed provisions of the relevant section of the draft convention.

SCHEDULE 2

AGGREGATE NATIONAL DATA
on the production, processing, consumption, export and import of
Schedule 2 chemicals
in 1989

1./ 1.Chemical name:N,N-diisopropile aminoethyl-2-chloride.HCl
name used by the facility: DAE.HCl
structural formula:



CASRN: (4261-68-1)

2.The total amount
produced: 5-10 t
consumed: 1-5 t
imported: 0
exported: 1-5 t to Finland

2./ 1.Chemical name:N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
name used by the facility:dimetilamino-etanol
structural formula:



CASRN: (108-01-0)

2.The total amount
produced: 0
consumed: 5-10 t
imported: 5-10 t from Federal Republic of Germany
exported 0

3./ 1.Chemical name:N,N-diethyl aminoethyl-2-chloride.HCl
name used by the facility:dietilamino-etilklorid
structural formula:



CASRN: (869-24-9)

2.The total amount:
produced: 0
consumed: 10-20 t
imported: 10-20 t from United Kingdom
exported 0

DECLARATION AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF NATIONAL DATA
on the production, processing, consumption, export and import

DECLARATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-diisopropile aminoethyl-2-chloride.HCl
   name used by the facility:DAE.HCl
   structural formula:



CASRN: (4261-68-1)

2. The total amount
   produced: 5-10 t
   consumed: 1-5 t
   imported: 0
   exported: 1-5 t

3.The purposes for which the chemical was produced,consumed or processed: (a) conversion on site to drug intermedier
(b) export to Finland

II.FACILITY

1. The name of the facility:KÉMIA-1
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility:Kőbányai Gyógyszerárugyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1103 Budapest 10.kerület Gyömrői ut 19-21
   Kémia-1 épület B szint

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   10-20 t

7.The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
(a) production
(b) processing with conversion into another chemical

DECLARATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
   name used by the facility:dimetilamino-etanol
   structural formula:



CASRN: (108-01-0)

2. The total amount
   produced:0
   consumed:1-5 t
   imported:1-5 t
   exported:0

3. The purposes for which the chemical was produced,consumed or processed:
   conversion on-site to intermedier

II. FACILITY

1. The name of the facility:Kémia-2
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility: EGIS Gyógyszergyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1106 Budapest
   10.kerület Keresztúri ut 30-38
   18.épület

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   production of intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   5-10 t

7. The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
   processing with conversion into another chemical

DECLARATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
   name used by the facility:dimetilamino-etanol
   structural formula:



CASRN: (108-01-0)

2. The total amount
   produced:0
   consumed:5-10 t
   imported:5-10 t
   exported:0

3. The purposes for which the chemical was produced,consumed or processed:
   conversion on-site to intermedier

II.FACILITY

1. The name of the facility: Biokémia-2
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility:Kőbányai Gyógyszerárugyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1103 Budapest
   10.kerület Gyömrői ut 19-21
   Biokémia-2 épület Feldolgozó üzem-2

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   production of intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   5-10 t

7. The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
   processing with conversion into another chemical

DECLARATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-diethyl aminoethyl-2-chloride.HCl
   name used by the facility:dietilamino-etilklorid
   structural formula:



CASRN: (869-24-9)

2. The total amount
   produced:0
   consumed:10-20 t
   imported:10-20 t
   exported:0

3.The purposes for which the chemical was produced,consumed or processed:
   conversion on-site to intermedier

II.FACILITY

1. The name of the facility:Kémia-2
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility: EGIS Gyógyszergyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1106 Budapest
   10.kerület Keresztúri ut 30-38
   18.épület

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   production of intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   20-50 t

7.The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
   processing with conversion into another chemical

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-diisopropile aminoethyl-2-chloride.HCl
   name used by the facility:DAE.HCl
   structural formula:



CASRN: (4261-68-1)

2. The total amount intended to be
   - produced:5-10 t
   - consumed:1-5 t

   in the I. quarter of 1990

3. The purposes for which the chemical will be produced and consumed: (a) conversion on site to drug intermedier
   (b) export to Finland

II. FACILITY

1. The name of the facility:KÉMIA-1
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility:Kőbányai Gyógyszerárugyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1103 Budapest 10.kerület Gyömrői ut 19-21
   Kémia-1 épület B szint

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   10-20 t

7. The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
   (a) production
   (b) processing with conversion into another chemical

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

I. CHEMICAL

1. Chemical name:N,N-dimethylamino-ethane-2-ol
   name used by the facility:dimetilamino-etanol
   structural formula:



   CASRN: (108-01-0)

2. The total amount inteded to be consumed:1-5 t

   in the III. quarter of 1990

3. The purposes for which the chemical will be consumed:

   conversion on-site to intermedier

II. FACILITY

1. The name of the facility:Kémia-2
   name of the owner: Hungarian state
   operating the facility: EGIS Gyógyszergyár

2. The exact location of the facility: 1106 Budapest
   10.kerület Keresztúri ut 30-38
   18.épület

3. The facility is a multipurpose facility

4. The main orientation of the facility:
   production of intermediers

5. The facility can not be used for the production of Schedule 1 chemical

6. The production capacity for the declared compound:
   5-10 t

7. The following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical:
   processing with conversion into another chemical

SCHEDULE 3

NATIONAL DATA
ON THE PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND THE FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCED CONSUMED, PROCESSED OR TRANSFERRED MORE THAN 30 TONNES IN 1989

DECLARATION

1. (a) Chemical name: carbonyl dichloride
common or trade name: phosgene
structural formula: $C(O)Cl_2$
CASRN: (75-44-5)

(b) The total amount
produced:10000-20000 t
consumed:10000-20000 t
imported: 0
exported: 0

(c) FACILITIES:

1. Name of the facility: Foszgén üzem
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Borsodi Vegyi Kombinát
location: 3702 Kazincbarcika Bólyai tér 1
capacity for production: 10000-20000 t
production: 10000-20000 t

2. Name of the facility: V gyár részleg
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility:északmagyarországi Vegyimüvek
location: 3792 Sajobábony
capacity for consumption: 10000-20000 t
consumption: 10000-20000 t

DECLARATION

2. (a) Chemical name: phosphonyl chloride
common or trade name: phosphorus oxichlorid
structural formula: P(O)Cl3
CASRN: (10025-87-3)

(b) The total amount
produced: 0
consumed: 200-500 t
imported: 200-500 t
exported: 0

(c) FACILITIES:

1. Name of the facility: Növényvédőszer üzem
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Alkaloida Vegyészeti Gyár
location: 4440 Tiszavasvári Kabai János u 29-31
capacity for consumption: 100-300 t
consumption: 100-300 t

2. Name of the facility: Szintetikus üzemcsoport-1
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: CHINOIN Gyógyszer és Vegyészeti Termékek Gyára
location: 1045 Budapest Tó u 1-5
capacity for consumption: 50-200 t
consumption: 50-200 t

DECLARATION

3. (a) Chemical name: Phosphorus trichloride
common or trade name: phosphorus trichloride
structural formula: PCl_3
CASRN: (7719-12-2)

(b) The total amount
produced: 0
consumed:5000-10000 t
imported:5000-10000 t
exported: 0

(C) FACILITIES:

1. Name of the facility: Intermedier 1.
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Borsodi Vegyi Kombinát
location: 3702 Kazincbarcika Bolyai tér 1.
capacity: for consumption:300-600 t
consumption: 300-600 t

2. Name of the facility: V1 és V2 gyáregység
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility:északmagyarországi Vegyimüvek
location: 3792 Sajóbábony
capacity for consumption: 500-1000 t
consumption:300-600 t

3. Name of the facility: 2. Gyáregység F üzem
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility:Nitrokémia Ipartelepek
location: 8184 Füzfőgyártelep
capacity for consumption: 5000-8000 t
consumption: 5000-6000 t

4. Name of the facility:Szerves A és B üzemcsoport
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Budapesti Vegyimüvek
location: 1097 Budapest 9.kerület Kén u 5.
capacity for consumption :100-200 t
consumption: 80-200 t

5.Name of the facility: Kémia
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: CAOLA Kozmetikai és
Háztartásvegyipari Vállalat Budapest
location: 8900 Zalaegerszeg Sport u. 5.
capacity for consumption 100-200 t
consumption: 50-200 t

DECLARATION

4. (a) Chemical name: Dimethyl-phosphite
common or trade name: dimethyl-phosphite
structural formula: 

CASRN: (868-85-9)

(b) The total amount
produced:1000-2000 t
consumed:1000-2000 t
imported: 0
exported: 0

(C) FACILITIES:

1. Name of the facility: 4.Gyáregység H üzem
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Nitrokémia Ipartelepek
location: 8184 Füzfőgyártelep
capacity for production: 1000-2000 t
production: 1000-2000 t

2. Name of the facility: Növényvédőszer üzem
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Alkaloida Vegyészeti Gyár
location: 4440 Tiszavasvári Kabai János u 29-31
capacity for consumption: 1000-2000 t
consumption: 1000-2000 t

DECLARATION

5. (a) Chemical name: Diethyl-phosphite
common or trade name: diethyl-phosphite
structural formula:



CASRN: (762-04-9)

(b) The total amount
produced:300-500 t
consumed:300-500 t
imported: 0
exported: 0

(C) FACILITY:

1. Name of the facility: Intermedier 1.
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Borsodi Vegyi Kombinát
location: 3702 Kazincbarcika Bólyai tér 1
capacity for production:500-1000 t
production:300-500 t

DECLARATION

6. (a) Chemical name: Thionyl-dichloride
common or trade name: thionyl-chloride
structural formula: $S(O)Cl_2$
CASRN: (7719-09-7)

(b) The total amount
produced: 0
consumed: 100-500 t
imported: 100-500 t
exported: 0

(C) FACILITIES:

1. Name of the facility: Kémia 2
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: EGIS Gyogyszergyár
location: 1106 Budapest 10.kerület
Kereszturi ut 30-38
capacity for consumption:100-200 t
consumption:100-200 t

2. Name of the facility: "A" gyár részleg
owner of the facility: Hungarian state
operating the facility: Északmagyarországi Vegyiműve
location: 3792 Sajóbábony
capacity for consumption: 100-200 t
consumption: 100-200 t

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/970
20 February 1990

ENGLISH
Original: ARABIC/ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN LIAISON AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN TRIPOLI ON 13 FEBRUARY 1990

... I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement issued by the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation in Tripoli on 13 February 1990, concerning the agreement reached by the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State on the question of chemical weapons.

I would be grateful if this statement be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Ibrahim Abdul-Aziz OMAR
Chargé d'Affaires

Statement by the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation

The People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation has issued the following statement:

"During the last two days, a Soviet - United States statement was issued at Moscow, concerning an agreement by the ministers for foreign affairs of the two countries on the need to eliminate chemical weapons throughout the world and their determination to work for the signature and application of a multilateral agreement prohibiting the production and use of chemical weapons and providing for the world-wide elimination of the stockpiles of such weapons. Having considered that statement, the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation wishes to emphasis the following:

1. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya welcomes the content of that statement and hopes that it will be fully applied.

2. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has already clearly stated its position in regard to these and other types of weapons of mass destruction and calls for the adoption of more far-reaching measures for the elimination of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons in order to protect mankind from their dangers and preclude any possibility of their use.

3. The Jamahiriya and the Arab nation as a whole are particularly well aware of the dangers posed by these weapons of mass destruction in view of their possession by the Zionist enemy in occupied Palestine, which is threatening the security of the region and also affecting world peace and security.

4. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, having shown the world the nature of the plant at Rabta, takes this opportunity to invite the States and companies throughout the world, which are concerned with the production of pharmaceuticals, to participate with us in the production of medicines and medical equipment.

13 February 1990"

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS DEPT.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/971

20 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT CONTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON AUSTRIAN PRODUCTION DATA RELEVANT TO THE FUTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

I have the honour to forward to you a document containing additional information on Austrian production data relevant to the future Chemical Weapons Convention. I would ask you to be kind enough to circulate this document as an official document of the Conference.

As you are well aware, the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alois MOCK, has announced this further information in his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 February 1990.

(Signed) Franz CESKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.90-60217/5394A

AUSTRIA

Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Update, 11 August 1989

In addition to the information available for the initial Austrian declaration (CD/CW/WP.238: AUSTRIA/provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention) the following new information was meanwhile obtained:

1. Inclusion of chemical companies belonging to the "Federal Section on Small-Scale Production" (Sektion Gewerbe) of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce (Bundeswirtschaftskammer)

In addition to the data initially provided by the member companies of the "Federation of the Austrian Chemical Industry" (FCIO; Fachverband der chemischen Industrie Österreichs) now also the member companies of the Federal Section on Small-Scale Production have provided their data, relevant to the Convention, on a voluntary basis. Thus, an even more complete picture of the actual situation within the Austrian chemical industry has been obtained.

2. Additional key precursor belonging to schedule 2.1

In addition to the key precursor chemicals already listed in table 2 of CD/CW/WP.238 Dimethylmethylphosphonate (DMMP; CAS 756-79-6) has been imported in 1988 in a total amount of less than 10 metric tons; it was quantitatively consumed in amounts greater than 1 but smaller than 10 tons, in the production of fire protection agents, at four Austrian chemical plants not identical with those mentioned in the initial report.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/972
21 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH and FRENCH

LETTER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE AUSTRIAN OFFER TO HOST THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN VIENNA

I have the honour to forward to you an Aide Mémoire on the Austrian offer to host the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Vienna and would ask you to be kind enough to circulate the Aide Mémoire as an official document of the Conference.

As you are well aware, the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois MOCK, has presented this offer in his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 February 1990.

(Signed): Franz CESKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

AIDE MEMOIRE

In the course of 1989, substantial progress could be achieved within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament towards concluding its work on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. Austria agrees with others who consider 1990 as the decisive year for a breakthrough in the negotiations.

Austria fully recognizes the great importance of such a Convention and of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons envisaged under its provisions. Already two years ago, Austria expressed for the first time her willingness, before the Conference on Disarmament, to host this Organization in Vienna. In the light of progress recently achieved in the negotiations, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Alois MOCK, has officially submitted the detailed Austrian offer in his statement addressing the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 February 1990. With this offer inviting the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to Vienna, Austria also hopes to provide an additional impulse to the negotiations with respect to the structure and tasks of the Organization.

Austria's readiness to contribute to the work of international organizations has in the past found its visible expression in the construction of the Vienna International Centre (VIC) housing the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNIDO) as well as the United Nations Office at Vienna. The Vienna International Centre was financed in its entirety by Austria and is at the disposal of its users for a symbolic rent of one Austrian shilling per year.

Austria is ready to host the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the VIC under the same conditions as apply to the organizations already located there.

(1) Austria will provide the Organization with office space commensurate with the personnel needs of the Organization during the preparatory phase, during the envisaged ten-year phase for the destruction of chemical weapons, and during the ensuing phase of permanent control activities. Austria intends to provide the Organization with provisional headquarters containing office space for 450 to 600 persons. This building, located in the centre of Vienna and providing net office space of 6,300 square meters, would be fully renovated and provided free of charge.

In order to provide for permanent headquarters, Austria envisages the construction of an office building in the area of the Vienna International Centre or adjacent to it as soon as the overall size is determined. Austria would provide the necessary land and bear the cost of construction of that office complex.

(2) In order to provide for equality of status between the new Organization and the international organizations housed in the VIC, Austria would grant to the Organization and its personnel the same immunities and privileges accorded to IAEA, the United Nations Office at Vienna, and UNIDO.

(3) Austria will reimburse the expenses incurred by the rental of adequate conference space for such conferences of the Organization that cannot be held in the building of the Organization itself or the VIC for reasons of size.

Moreover, the future Organization could profit from the following facts:

- the possibility of direct communication with the United Nations system,

- the possibility of a close exchange of know-how with the IAEA located in Vienna since 1957, which has accumulated ample experience in the field of inspection,

- the possibility of cost reductions through the joint use of technical facilities,

- the facilitation of work owing to Vienna's experience in organizing international conferences and the availability of the necessary personnel and technical infrastructure.

International civil servants of the future Organizations could make use of those advantages available in a city which has oriented itself towards an international community for many years: the existence of ten schools of international character providing tuition in eight different languages, three foreign-language theatres and the existence of churches and houses of worship for many religions.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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EPT
CD/973
23 February 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS FROM THE WYOMING AND MOSCOW MEETINGS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents from the Wyoming and Moscow Meetings between the United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

- Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States of America, on 23 September 1989.

- The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons signed 23 September 1989, in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States of America.

- Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 10 February 1990.

- The Chapeau and Part I (Arms Control and Disarmament Issues) of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Joint Statement adopted in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 February 1990.

In accordance with past practice and agreement, Minister Batsanov, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in Russian to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to enter these papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Representative of the United States
of America to the Conference on Disarmament

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*/ The official Russian texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/974.

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
23 September 1989

During their 22-23 September meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all States it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the Convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a co-operative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the

final declaration of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all States not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the United Nations Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference against chemical weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between Government and industy representatives from around the world. The sides expressed satisfaction with the extensive and productive work accomplished at the conference and the positive results reflected in the Chairman's final summary statement.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long-term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasised their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE RELATED TO PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Determined to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,

Convinced that increased openness about their chemical weapons capabilities is essential for building the confidence necessary for early completion of the convention,

Desiring also to gain experience in the procedures and measures for verification of the convention,

Having agreed as follows:

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall conduct a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange shall be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall exchange general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the two sides shall exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspection to verify the accuracy of those data.

3. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons by:

(1) enabling each side to gain confidence in the data on chemical weapons capabilities that will be provided under the provisions of the convention;

(2) enabling each side to gain confidence in the inspection procedures that will be used to verify compliance with the convention; and

(3) facilitating the elaboration of the provisions of the convention.

4. Terms used in this Memorandum shall have the same meaning as in the draft convention text under negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft convention text that is current as of the date of the exchange of data shall be used.

5. Data shall be current as of the date of the exchange, and shall encompass all sites and facilities specified below, wherever they are located.

6. Each side shall take appropriate steps to protect the confidentiality of the data it receives. Each side undertakes not to divulge this data without the explicit consent of the side that provided the data.

II. PHASE I

In Phase I, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons;

2. the specific types of chemicals it possesses that are defined as chemical weapons, indicating the common name of each chemical;

3. the percentage of each of its declared chemicals that is stored in munitions and devices, and the percentage that is stored in storage containers;

4. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

5. for each of its declared chemical weapons storage facilities:

   - the common name of each chemical defined as a chemical weapon that is stored there;

   - the percentage of the precise aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons that is stored there; and

   - the specific types of munitions and devices that are stored there;

6. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons production facilities, indicating the common name of each chemical that has been or is being produced at each facility; and

7. the precise location of each of its facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, including those currently existing, under construction, or planned.

In Phase I, each side shall permit the other side to visit some of its chemical weapons storage and production facilities, the exact number of which will be agreed upon as soon as possible. In addition, each side shall permit the other side to visit two industrial chemical production facilities. Each side will select the facilities to be visited by the other side.

III. PHASE II

In Phase II, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the chemical name of each chemical it possesses that is defined as a chemical weapon;

2. the detailed inventory, including the quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

3. its preliminary general plans for destruction of chemical weapons under the convention, including the characteristics of the facilities it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

4. the capacity of each of its chemical weapons production facilities;

5. preliminary general plans for closing and destroying each of its chemical weapons production facilities under the convention, including the methods it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

6. the precise location and capacity of its planned single small-scale facility allowed under the convention for the production, for non-prohibited purposes under strict safeguards, of a limited quantity of chemicals that pose a high risk, i.e, Schedule 1 chemicals;

7. the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

IV. TIMING

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data shall be exchanged not later than 31 December 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 30 June 1990, provided that the sides have agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the number of visits, as well as on the programmes and other detailed arrangements for the visits and assuming that the sides have agreed by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility to be visited by each side in its first visit to the other side.

2. In Phase I each side may withhold temporarily, for reasons of security, data on the locations of storage facilities that together contain a total quantity of chemical weapons that is not more than 2 per cent of the precise quantity of its chemical weapons. In addition, the other data pertaining to these locations, as specified in Section II, paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the heading "other storage locations" without reference to specific locations. Precise data pertaining to these locations shall be exchanged later in Phase I on a subsequent date to be agreed.

3. Phase II data shall be exchanged on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text of the convention. At that time, both sides shall formally and jointly acknowledge the possibility of initialing the convention within four months.

V. VERIFICATION

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data.

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold consultations to discuss the information that has been presented and visits that have been exchanged. The sides will co-operate in clarifying ambiguous situations.

3. During Phase II, each side shall have the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase II data by means of on-site inspections. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been

exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapons capabilities of the sides.

4. Prior to the initialing of the convention, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities and chemical weapons production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side if their number is more than 10. Should either side as of the date of the Phase II exchange possess a single small-scale facility for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it shall be subject to an additional inspection.

Each side shall also have the opportunity to carry out up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. All inspections shall be carried out within the agreed four months from the date of the declaration pertaining to Phase II, referred to in Section IV.

5. While the signed convention is being considered by their respective legislative bodies, each side shall have the opportunity to request from the other side, and to obtain from it, updated data. Each side shall have the opportunity to conduct up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. During this process, the two sides will consult with their respective legislative bodies, as appropriate, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

For each side, these inspections shall be carried out within a four-month period, beginning with the date that it conducts its first inspection. The sides shall consult and agree on the dates when the first inspection will be conducted by each side. The dates shall be chosen to ensure that the inspections shall be conducted by both sides at approximately the same time. Once the inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual consent, extend the four-month periods for an additional specified period.

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections, shall be conducted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the draft convention, taking into account that these inspections are being carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve the bodies that will be established under the convention. If necessary, the two sides shall supplement the provisions of the draft convention by mutually-agreed procedures.

7. Challenge inspections may be made at any location or facility of the other side, as provided for in the draft convention text, except that, for the purposes of this Memorandum and without creating a precedent, challenge inspections at facilities not on the territory of the sides may be made only at military facilities of a side in a limited number of countries; the sides will agree later on these specific countries.

8. Challenge inspections conducted pursuant to this Memorandum shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the domestic law of the side being inspected and shall be based on a recognition by both sides of the need to resolve concerns and build confidence.

9. To clarify questions related to the data provided during Phase I and Phase II, the two sides shall employ normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as may be agreed upon.

VI. FORMAT

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

2. Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and significant geographical relief features in the vicinity of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the diagram shall clearly specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic co-ordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

VII. ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: James A. Baker III

10 February 1990

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

During their 7-9 February meeting in Moscow, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed that chemical weapons must be eliminated worldwide. They have agreed on the following framework for the achievement of this goal which they consider to be a high priority:

- The sides are determined to work to conclude and bring into force a multilateral, effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis. To this effect they will work to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving main outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

- Even as these multilateral negotiations proceed, the sides will work out a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations pending the international Convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. They will proceed with the objective of completing and signing such an agreement at the June 1990 summit meeting.

- The agreement would establish a programme of co-operation on technology and procedures for safe and expeditious as well as economically and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons.

- When the CW Convention enters into force, the sides will further reduce their CW stocks to equal levels at a very small fraction of their present holdings over the first eight years of operation of the Convention. All remaining CW stocks should be eliminated over the subsequent two years. Of course, all CW-capable States must adhere to the Convention. Meanwhile, the sides will closely co-operate with each other and together with other States to ensure that all CW-capable States adhere to the Convention. Efforts to this effect are to begin without delay. The sides share the view that both nations should be among the original parties to the Convention whose ratification would be necessary for its entry into force.

- The multilateral Convention shall contain the provision that all production of chemical weapons will halt upon its entry into force.

- The sides will work out common principles that will guide their efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

10 February 1990

FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met 7-9 February in Moscow as part of the preparations for the United States-Soviet summit to be held in June in the United States. Proceeding from their common goal of building a more stable, constructive and co-operative relationship, they reviewed the broad range of issues on the United States-Soviet agenda. The Secretary also was received by Chairman Gorbachev for an open, wide-ranging exchange of views.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed developments in United States-Soviet relations since the Wyoming ministerial and the Malta meeting between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev. They examined the prospects for the summit, with the particular aim of advancing the objectives and priorities defined by the two leaders in Malta.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction the progress that is being made in United States-Soviet relations. While certain significant differences remain between the sides, their relationship is increasingly marked by understanding, co-operation and the search for mutual advantage. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that candid dialogue and continuing efforts at finding practical and concrete solutions will further the significant progress that has been recorded to date.

In this context, the Moscow ministerial was a useful and important step in preparing the ground for a productive summit. The high-level discussions were complemented by experts' working groups on arms control, regional, human rights, transnational and bilateral issues, as well as an informal group on economic questions. Specific agreements were reached in several areas of the agenda.

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The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough exchange of views on arms control and disarmament issues. With respect to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, they reaffirmed their common objective, of resolving all major issues by the June summit in order to allow signature of the Treaty by the end of the year. To further this goal, the sides reached agreement or exchanged new proposals in a number of areas.

On air-launched cruise missiles, the sides made substantial progress on a package approach, agreeing on all remaining issues with the exception of the range threshold.

The sides also made good progress on sea-launched cruise missiles. The sides agreed that such missiles would be dealt with by parallel, politically binding declarations for the duration of the START Treaty. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that the remining issues involving SLCMs would be addressed at the negotiations in Geneva.

The sides agreed that there would be numerical limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributable to them for all ICBMs of a

type that has been flight-tested from a mobile launcher. Other non-deployed ballistic missiles, non-deployed cruise missiles and non-deployed heavy bomber weapons will not be subject to numerical limits. The sides further agreed on a régime governing the location and movement of all non-deployed ballsitic missiles.

The sides reached agreement on major elements of a régime to ensure the non-denial of telemetry data during flight tests of START-accountable ballistic missiles. These provisions will be included in the START Treaty, but will be implemented early, at the time of Treaty signature, through an exchange of letters.

The United States side presented new proposals on verification of mobile ICBMs, duration of the Treaty, phasing of reductions and attribution of warheads to future types of ballistic missiles. The Soviet side presented new proposals dealing with non-circumvention. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister instructed their negotiators to discuss these new proposals and to expedite efforts on resolving remaining differences in the text of the Treaty and its associated documents.

The sides discussed the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions and reiterated their determination to conclude an agreement as soon as possible in 1990. The sides discussed President Bush's 31 January proposal on manpower which was presented by NATO in Vienna on 8 February, as well as NATO's aircraft proposal presented on the same date. As a result of the discussions in Moscow, the differences on personnel were narrowed. The sides agreed to continue their discussions in the context of the negotiations in Vienna and at the Ministers' meeting on "Open Skies" in Ottawa.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had extensive discussions on how to proceed toward their common goal of achieving, through the negotiations in Geneva, a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and of their destruction. The United States and Soviet delegations in Geneva were instructed to proceed with developing means of practical co-operation in the area of chemical weapons elimination. The sides issued a separate, more detailed statement on chemical weapons.

In discussions on nuclear testing, the sides made progress on resolving the remaining issues. They believe that the task of completing the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 threshold limitation treaties for signing at the summit is realistic. The sides agreed on the right to simultaneous use of hydrodynamic and in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides also resolved several long-standing problems regarding the implementation of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. The sides identified the three seismic stations in each country to be used for in-country seismic yield measurements. The sides reaffirmed their adherence to the agreement reached in September 1987 with regard to the negotiations on nuclear testing.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed their hope that the Ottawa "Open Skies" conference - which they will both attend - would be a success and lead to early agreement. They believe an "Open Skies" régime can make a genuine contribution to openness, transparency and stability.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted the recent consultations between their experts on chemical weapons non-proliferation, missile technology control and nuclear non-proliferation. They agreed to prepare a document for consideration by their leaders covering both principles and concrete steps of co-operation in all areas of non-proliferation - chemical, missile and nuclear.

The sides conducted a discussion of the problem of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. They noted that they both adhere to the export guidelines of the existing régime relating to missiles, which applies to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres. They further agreed to continue joint discussions on this problem in the interim before the next ministerial.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/974
23 February 1990

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS FROM THE WYOMING AND MOSCOW MEETINGS BETWEEN THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE, AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES A. BAKER III */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents from the Wyoming and Moscow meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States Secretary of State:

Joint statement on chemical weapons by the USSR and the United States adopted in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States, on 23 September 1989;

Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons, signed on 23 September 1989 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States;

Joint statement on chemical weapons by the USSR and the United States adopted in Moscow on 10 February 1990;

Chapeau and part I (Arms control and disarmament issues) a second Soviet-United States joint statement adopted in Moscow on 10 February 1990.

In accordance with the past practice and the agreement reached, Ambassador S. Ledogar, the United States representative at the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in English to the Conference on Disarmament.

Please make appropriate arrangements for these documents to be issued as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and those of non-member States of the Conference which are participating in the Conference's work.

(Signed) S. Batsanov
Representative of the USSR
at the Conference on Disarmament

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*/ The official English texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/973.

GE.90-60256/5460A

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/975
CD/CW/WP.278
9 March 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Federal Republic of Germany

Report on a trial challenge inspection

In August 1989 the Federal Republic of Germany conducted a national trial challenge inspection at an ammunition depot of the Air Force. The trial inspection showed that, through a combination of expert assessment of secondary indicators and random on-site checks, it is possible to dispel with a fairly high degree of certainty the suspicion that chemical weapons are produced or stockpiled at an ammunition depot, without sensitive information having to be disclosed.

1. Aims

The trial insepection was intended above all to clarify questions concerning

- the input needed to reveal violations of the convention,
- proof of compliance with the convention, without disclosing sensitive information.

2. Facility inspected

The trial inspection was carried out at an ammunition depot of the Air Force covering an area of approximately 150 hectares. The depot comprises a storage area with about 35 ammunition stores and ammunition service buildings, an administrative area with offices and accommodation, and a technical area. The depot has several gates linking it to road and railway systems.

3. Inspection team and in-country escort

The inspection team consisted of five persons:

- two chemical weapons specialists responsible for the actual inspection activities;
- one expert in depot organization;

- two safety experts responsible for checking the safety measures of the unit inspected.

One officer was acting as an observer of the challenging State. There was an official in-country escort.

4. Preparations

The trial inspection was conducted on the basis of the relevant provisions of the rolling text of the convention (CD/881 of 3 February 1989).

The facility was informed a few days in advance of the envisaged inspection.

5. The inspection proper

The inspection team, the escort and the observer were welcomed at the main entrance by depot officers and accompanied to a briefing room. The depot commander gave a general description of the facility in his initial briefing.

On the basis of a layout plan handed out to the inspectors and the escort, the main items of the depot were explained, with a distinction being made between the administrative and ammunition areas. After this outline of the facility, the inspectors and escort were familiarized with the safety regulations for the visit to the ammunition area.

The depot commander's briefing was followed by intensive questioning by the inspectors. In the case of questions not connected with the inspection assignment, e.g. ones concerning manpower, guards and the like, the in-country escort refused to answer on the grounds that the questions were irrelevant to the purposes of the inspection.

Even in this initial phase the reactions and answers to the questions asked by the inspectors, partly in rapid succession, can serve as first indications of whether something is being concealed in connection with the official challenge and whether the staff of the facility are reasonably willing to lend their support.

After arriving at the inspection site, the leader of the inspection team asked the depot commander to arrange for all entrances and exits of the depot to be closed, except for the main entrance. (In the case of a genuine inspection, considerable time and personnel would be needed, especially at large facilities, for closing the entrances/exits and monitoring their closure.)

Subsequently, the briefing room was placed at the disposal of the inspectors as a working room.

After the inspectors had completed their deliberations on the procedure for the inspection, the inspectors and escort made a joint tour of the facility in a bus. The inspectors simultaneously used this trip to enter the items to be inspected in the layout plan handed out to them. The inspectors paid particular attention to such details as:

- clothing and equipment of the staff;
- specific building features;
- treatment of liquid waste;
- stunted growth of vegetation.

This familiarization trip, which gave the inspectors an impression of the overall facility, was followed by a tour on foot of the administrative area, with random checks being made. For this purpose the inspectors had selected certain key items, such as the:

- medical station;
- workshops;
- stores and storage sites;
- scrapyard.

Even at this stage the inspectors were able, on account of the secondary indicators, to make an initial, unexpectedly clear assessment of whether chemical warfare agents are stockpiled or produced at the facility. It is therefore highly important to include a depot's administrative area in an inspection.

In the ammunition area, the inspectors specifically examined the repair unit, the incoming/outgoing goods unit and two ammunition stores. For this purpose the inspectors formed two groups, each of which was escorted. At this inspection stage, too, the inspectors paid attention to such secondary indicators as type of bunker, signposting, decontamination installations and the like.

Only a small part of the overall inspection was spent examining the stockpiled ammunition. Some of the ammunition was contained in sealed shipping or storage containers. This meant that it would not have been possible to examine them without damaging the seals. However, on the basis of

the features of the storage site and the containers and with the aid of simple sampling the inspectors would be able to rule out with a high degree of probability any chemical warfare agents being stored in the containers.

In a final inspection phase, ammunition experts of the inspection team explained the use of measuring and testing equipment for detecting chemical warfare agents. Using the mobile equipment it is possible, on the basis of modern technology (e.g. X-ray measurements, detection of any liquid content by a stethoscope) and without opening or chemical analysis, to distinguish on site in most cases between warfare agents with a chemical charge and ones with solely an explosive charge.

Within a fairly brief space of time it should be possible, with simple analyses using mobile equipment, to ascertain with sufficient certainty whether chemical weapons were produced or stockpiled in the ammunition depot on the day of the inspection or a while before it.

The inspection was terminated after about six hours once it became evident that no additional significant information could be obtained.

6. Conclusions

6.1 General

Summing up the experiences gained with this inspection, it can be stated that, with the aid of secondary indicators and relatively simple on-site checks, the suspicion that chemical weapons are being produced or stockpiled at an ammunition depot can be dispelled with sufficient certainty. A challenge inspection can be conducted in this manner, without having to rely on sensitive information. Sensitive areas can be protected, without impairing the aims or proceedings of an inspection.

The inspection team can obtain important information from the briefing, the questioning (including questions concerning such operating data as water and energy consumption), the inspection of the administrative area, the absence of rescue facilities and the attitude of the staff towards personal safety. The assessment of such secondary indicators thus acquires special importance, which had generally not been presumed. Hence the administrative area should also be included in an inspection.

6.2 Proposals

Apart from the aforementioned experiences, the following proposals for the conduct of chemical weapons challenge inspections can be derived from the trial inspection:

- specialized staff at the facility inspected must make available all operating data, e.g. on water supply and disposal, energy consumption;
- skilled staff at the facility inspected must be accessible at all times during the inspection;
- it must be ensured that in cases of doubt or reasonable suspicion access is granted to areas regarded as sensitive by the inspected party. In such instances, the need for confidentiality can be fully met by appropriate precautions, such as removing or covering accessible papers, illustrations or maps, switching off computers, protecting classified components;
- layout plans of the items involved are needed for conducting the inspection;
- the inspected party's briefing on the facility should be of limited duration and not be regarded as part of the inspection period. Questioning by the inspection team should, however, be included in the inspection period;
- the tasks and rights of the challenging State's observer must be precisely defined, especially to what extent access and the right to ask questions should be granted to him;
- the inspection team should have support staff of its own. Such staff are needed, inter alia, for closing (sealing) the exits and controlling the vehicles leaving or entering the main entrance kept open;
- the practical conduct of an inspection with mobile measuring and testing equipment and with the analysis of samples needs to be tried out in order to obtain an indication of the time and effort required.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/976
9 March 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"
(Adopted at the 541st plenary meeting on 8 March 1990)

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1990 session.

GE.90-60324/2949a

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/977
12 March 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 MARCH 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION WITH DISARMAMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, ISSUED IN PYONGYANG ON 5 MARCH 1990

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connection with disarmament on the Korean Peninsula, issued in Pyongyang, 5 March 1990.

I should be grateful if you could circulate it as an information document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Ri Tcheul
Ambassador

Statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Regional disputes are being solved through negotiations and steps for disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops put into practice in the current trend of international détente and reconciliation.

On the Korean peninsula, however, no agreement for the relaxation of tension has been reached and confrontation continues.

The North and the South of Korea are standing in acute confrontation with huge armed forces along the military demarcation line.

The United States keeps its troops more than 43,000 strong in South Korea and has shipped there more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of all kinds, means of their delivery and even neutron bombs.

The nuclear war strategy of the United States is in fact entering a stage of full-scale practice on the Korean peninsula.

Thus, a dangerous situation which cannot be found in any other part of the world constantly prevails in Korea and it gives rise to apprehensions of the world's peace-loving people.

For the relaxation of the tension and guarantee of peace on the Korean peninsula, it is imperative to defuse the military confrontation through military cuts.

From its consistent stand to achieve détente and peace on the Korean peninsula through military reduction, the Government of our Republic advanced a series of reasonable proposals and took initiatives in recent years including a proposal to discontinue arms build-up and arms race and a proposal to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Notably, in July 1987, it put forward a proposal for the North and the South to cut their armed forces stage by stage down to less than 100,000 men by 1992 and, keeping pace with this, to completely withdraw the United States forces on a phased basis from South Korea and make mutual information and international verification for this and proposed a multinational disarmament negotiation to discuss this problem.

And last year it urged the United States and the South Korean authorities to hold at an early date negotiations for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone even before reaching a blanket agreement on the disarmament question in face of the ever-growing danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK Government has not only put forward disarmament proposals but also unilaterally slashed the Korean people's army by 100,000 men by the end of 1987 in order to make a substantial breakthrough in arms reduction on the Korean peninsula and, earlier, took a positive step of mobilizing 150,000 troops in peaceful construction.

Up until now, however, the United States and the South Korean authorities have failed to show any response to our reasonable proposals and sincere efforts for disarmament, and are taking the road of reinforcing and streamlining the United States forces present in South Korea on the pretext of fictitious "threat from the North" and are aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula by their annual provocative "team spirit" joint military exercises.

Facts clearly show that it is entirely because of their line of confrontation and war that the danger of war has not been removed and the unstable situation of growing tension is prevailing on the Korean peninsula.

A brisk debate over troop pullout has arisen within the United States itself, whilst the demand for the withdrawal of the United States forces from South Korea is mounting rapidly among the South Korean people and the world's peace-loving people at present.

Against this background, United States Defence Secretary Cheney visited South Korea some time ago and discussed matters of the United States troop pullout from South Korea.

But the United States, while talking about a partial withdrawal of the United States troops from South Korea, insists that it should be a "readjustment of armed forces" in any case and the main combat forces and military means would be left in South Korea.

On the other hand, they make incoherent remarks claiming that "a visible arms reduction" would be impossible unless the North takes steps for détente, and the United States forces must be kept in South Korea as "a deterrent".

All this causes many doubts about the ulterior intention of the United States in advertising "pullout".

As everyone knows, the DPRK Government has declared on many occasions that it has no intention to "invade the South" and it is not capable of doing that.

If the United States is truly interested in peace on the Korean peninsula, it must take practical steps for troop pullout, instead of talking about "readjustment of armed forces".

If the United States practically takes at least a step for partial pullout which would mark the start of the complete withdrawal of the United States forces from South Korea, we will welcome it and we are ready to take more necessary measures corresponding to it for military confidence and disarmament between the North and the South.

Peace on the Korean peninsula can be achieved only when the United States forces are withdrawn from this region and their military bases dismantled there and arms reduction is realized between the North and the South.

The DPRK Government will, as in the past, so in the future, too, make every possible effort to provide a practical guarantee for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

We urge once again the United States and the South Korean authorities to stop such military exercises as "team spirit 90" and immediately respond to negotiations for arms reduction involving the North and the South of Korea and the United States, which was already proposed by the DPRK Government.

If the United States withdraws its troops from South Korea, this will not only conform to the desire and interests of the peoples of Korea and the United States and of the peace-loving people across the world but also create a favourable atmosphere for the realization of North-South dialogue for peace on the Korean peninsula and its reunification and, further contribute to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

The South Korean authorities must not entreat for the indefinite presence of the United States forces nor act against the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

Pyongyang, 5 March 1990

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/978
15 March 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 MARCH 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MR. GEORGE BUSH, IN COMMEMORATION OF THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

I have the honour to forward to you the attached statement issued by the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, in commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to enter this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR

Representative of the
United States of America
to the Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN COMMEMORATION OF THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

5 MARCH 1990

Twenty years ago today, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entered into force. One hundred and forty States have joined the Treaty, making it the most widely accepted arms control instrument in history. The NPT represents the primary legal barrier to nuclear proliferation and thus constitutes a principal foundation of international security. Later this year, the parties to the NPT will convene the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty. In the context of this Review, I reaffirm the determination of the United States to carry out its Treaty commitments and to work to assure its continuance in the interest of world peace and security.

The NPT has been not only a significant arms control instrument, it has also facilitated international co-operation in a wide variety of peaceful uses of atomic energy under international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These applications have included using nuclear technology to improve health conditions, as well as to increase agricultural output, electric power generation, and industrial capabilities. The United States will continue to play a leading role in nuclear co-operation pursuant to the Treaty.

Our long-standing commitment to serious arms control negotiations has helped to bring forth a number of important arms control agreements, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, concluded in 1987. At this very moment we are making significant strides toward concluding far-reaching arms control agreements in the nuclear and conventional areas.

It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. I urge all States that are not party to the NPT to join and thereby demonstrate their support for the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, and I call upon all States party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries.

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